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Introduction 
This article shows how Europe (as in the EU plus its member states) practices on the ground 
its stated position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by highlighting the existence of a 
community of European practitioners in the Jerusalem area. As no peace agreement is 
looming on the horizon, the often-stated EU support for a two-state solution could appear 
meaningless. However, a closer look at the local level in the East Jerusalem-Ramallah area 
shows a commitment of European diplomats (i.e. diplomats of EU member states and EU 
officials) to specific practices of political resistance to Israeli occupation and recognition of 
Palestinian institutions. My claim here is that these practices have led not only to a specific 
political geography of diplomacy in the Jerusalem area, but also to the formation of a 
community of practice, composed of European diplomats and based on their daily experience 
of resisting occupation and bestowing recognition. It is this group of officials who represent 
and actively ‘do’ Europe’s position on the ground and under occupation. 
 
The main contribution of this article to the special issue is to show the relevance of a practice 
mechanism to our understanding of politics, namely the role of communities of practice 
(CoPs) (Wenger 1998, p.5, Adler 2009, Bicchi 2011) (see also Graeger and Bremberg in this 
collection). In a nutshell, a CoP is a community that is based on a practice. By practicing the 
practice, the group develops a specific identity and a set of resources specific to the group. 
Therefore, CoPs bring a focus on the group and on the activity the group is involved in. The 
activity (or more specifically the practice) constitutes the group (the community) and a 
number of key characteristics of the group. In the case analysed here, by practising political 
resistance and political recognition in a context of conflict and occupation, European 
diplomats in the Jerusalem area develop a European identity and a set of common European 
policy tools that they consider appropriate. A focus on CoPs, therefore, brings the story to 
life, by highlighting who is actually doing what when and where, beyond for instance the 
institutional rules of what should happen.  
 
This article also adds to the literature on CoPs, in two ways. First, it highlights the 
importance of ‘landscapes’ of practices, defined as a complex system of communities of 
practice and the boundaries between them (Wenger-Trayner, Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2015). 
Given that CoPs are constituted by practices, the practices’ context within which a CoP is 
situated is important in the analysis of how the CoP develops. As we are going to see, the 
diplomatic landscape of the Jerusalem area has its own specificities, which affect how Europe 
is represented on the ground. Second, this article takes sides in the discussion about CoPs, by 
stressing their intrinsic local nature and the communality of interpretation on the ground, as 
opposed to the concept being used as a metaphor for broader ‘imagined’ communities. 
Whereas for instance it is possible to think of diplomacy as an imagined community to which 
all diplomats belong, a more specific sense of European belonging occurs in the CoP 
scrutinised here.  
 
A second related aim of this article stresses the relevance of local, daily doings. The article 
shifts the emphasis in the analysis of EU foreign policy and European diplomacy from the 
broader picture, which at times can seem generic, to the smaller story, which can deliver a 
more conclusive set of evidence. This shift of focus is not intended to contradict the broader 
analysis, which has characterised much of literature on EU foreign policy and diplomacy. 
Rather, it aims to add depth and detail to it, by capturing the universal as embedded in the 
local practice and by emphasising the link between the universal and the local. This is not a 
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methodological point, it is an ontological one. The assumption here is that the universal, the 
broad categorisation and the more abstract pattern must be embodied in the local practice, if 
they are to have meaning in a given context. A focus on the local is consistent with the 
analysis of “sites” in diplomacy (Neumann 2012), as well as with the trend across European 
studies to highlight “the everyday” of European integration and to privilege “the point of 
view of the people actually producing” Europe (Adler‐Nissen 2016, p.88). Similarly, “daily 
life” is what makes Europe’s imagined community (McNamara 2015). Put differently, the 
local is where the universal is to be found. 
 
The practice of European diplomats in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a particularly 
good case study for a micro-story. The EU has often been accused of not doing enough 
(Aoun 2003), of allowing a gap between rhetoric and reality (Tocci 2005), of being a failure 
(Livingston 2014). In public debates, the discussion about Europe’s alleged boycott of Israel 
has pitched Israel’s supporters against promoters of the Boycott Divest Sanction (BDS) 
campaign. There is clearly an issue here, which goes beyond a possible capability-
expectations gap (Hill 1993) in European diplomatic practices. Therefore, it is legitimate to 
ask what precisely the EU is doing in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
The angle taken here in relation to European diplomatic practices centres on practices of 
political resistance and recognition, in a context of occupation. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a 
conflict about the land, but not just about physical control of the land (which Israel de facto 
has since 1967). Rather, the conflict is also and especially a conflict about the legitimate 
control of the land, which Israel craves and Palestinians aim to prevent. While there is a legal 
and a social side to the story, resistance and recognition are political practices, enacted by a 
variety of international actors. Western countries have managed to retain a central role in the 
recognition of new states and thus act as gate-keepers in terms of providing the ultimate 
legitimation of other states’ existence and territorial scope. The practice of (political) 
recognition is relevant in the case of Palestine, which has launched in 2012 a campaign to be 
legally recognised by the minority group of states that still does not recognise it, among 
which Western European countries. The practice of (political) resistance to occupation is 
relevant in terms of relations with Israel. The mere presence of European diplomatic 
representations in the area is contested, and the location and denomination of European 
diplomatic representation in the Jerusalem area respond to a precise political logic. As a 
result, European diplomats have turned into a CoP, with a specific identity and set of tools, as 
shown in the case of report drafting. The opinions expressed therein have tended to be more 
assertive than the attitudes prevailing in Brussels, and even more so than those expressed in 
capitals. Doing Europe under occupation in this case has taken more assertive shades. 
 
The evidence on European diplomats in the Jerusalem area was gathered predominantly from 
desk work in 2009 and during three trips to Jerusalem and Ramallah between 2010 and 2014, 
which generated 17 in-depth interviews with diplomats of EU member states and EU 
officials. These were also accompanied by approx.. 20 non-structured contacts with press 
officials, assistants and secretaries working in European representations, as well as with 
employees of European NGOs, lasting from a few minutes (e.g. the time to explain the 
system for car registration numbers imposed by Israel) to a couple of hours (e.g. a lunch 
discussing German foundations’ work in Palestine). The three trips were also an opportunity 
to explore prima facie the reality of occupation in the Jerusalem area, while gathering 
material in various forms from locals (e.g. nobody seem to know where the EU Delegation
i
 is 
or even the street name). To all formal interviewees I guaranteed anonymity and I will stretch 
that rule to include the other informants too for excess of prudence. Generalisations in this 
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article are thus limited to the period ending in 2014 and the overall goal is to illustrate rather 
than demonstrate.  
 
The article will start with a short clarification of the concept of CoPs. It will then analyse the 
‘landscape’ of practices (Wenger-Trayner, Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2015) in the East 
Jerusalem-Ramallah area and European diplomats’ practices of resistance and recognition, by 
exploring the diplomatic geography of Jerusalem and Ramallah. Third, it will focus on the 
identity and the tools that this European diplomatic group has developed. It will conclude by 
pointing how this story contributes to broader debates in European foreign policy analysis 
and in IR more generally.  
 
What CoPs are 
The expression “community of practice” has spread widely in IR (Adler 2008, Adler 2009, 
Bicchi 2011, Bremberg 2014, Davies 2015, Goff 2015, Zwolski 2016) as well as in studies of 
European diplomacies (see for instance Graeger, Bremberg, and Merand/Rayroux in this 
issue). But it is still crucial to summarise the concept’s definition and highlight the elements 
that identify a CoP, in order to have a ‘blueprint’ for recognising one and understanding how 
it works. To this, I will add two points, about the relationship between a CoP and its context, 
as well as about the level at which to situate the CoP. 
 
It was Etienne Wenger’s book that sparked the first wave of CoPs studies (1998) by 
providing a definition of CoP that has become the standard across disciplines.
ii
 He identified 
three elements: an ongoing mutual engagement (the practice); a sense of joint enterprise (the 
identity, the community); and a shared repertoire (the tools). These represent the point of 
reference for the concept in IR literature.  
 
The first element is the practice. Members build their community through a practice, when 
they do something on a regular basis (which also gives the CoP a history). “The concept of 
practice connotes doing, but not just doing in and of itself. It is doing in a historical and 
social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do” (Wenger 1998, p. 47). A 
practice is thus always a social practice, which produces meaning, provides coherence in a 
community and delivers learning for new comers. Moreover – and this is particularly 
important for the claim I am making in this article – practice is locally situated. An example 
here would be a post in a different diplomatic representation. While the job description may 
remain the same, the way it is actually done, in the local site, will be different and will need 
a learning process. The first indicator of a CoP, therefore, is the existence of specific 
practices, i.e. specific patterns of social actions that are recognised as meaningful by the 
individuals involved. 
 
Second, according to Wenger, members are bound together by a common identity forged in 
their practicing a practice together. This is important because, despite the longstanding 
tradition of analysing communities and the much shorter history of practice approaches, it is 
the practice that aggregates the community, not the community that invents the practice (cf. 
Nicolini 2013, pp.86-92). To put it differently, the community is constituted in the act of 
practising (Gherardi 2006, p.221, p.108) and the two are not mutually co-constitutive. This 
aspect refers to the transformative effects that a routine of socially meaningful doing brings 
to a group and to the sense of joint enterprise involved in accomplishing a task. This does 
not drive out the possibility of in-group contestation, as for instance masters might be 
challenged by advanced novices. Moreover, not everybody has to agree on what the end 
goal is and how to reach it. But there must be a local, contextualised, indigenous response to 
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external challenges. There needs to be a feeling of ‘appropriated’ enterprise (Cox 2005: 
532), in which for instance members re-interpret (and most likely distort) the will of the 
overarching institutional authority. A community of practice is therefore a “community of 
interpretation,” within which “the shared means for interpreting complex activity get 
formed, transformed, and transmitted” (Brown and Duguid 1991, 47). The key point is that 
dissent becomes more likely outside the group than inside. This explains also the thickness 
of social relations surrounding the practice: members sustain “dense” relations of mutual 
engagement organised around what they are to do (Wenger 1998, 74). The second indicator 
of a Cop is a set of pointers suggesting the existence of a community, including a common 
identity (which differentiates between insiders and outsiders), a common interpretation of 
what needs to be done and density of mutual relations. 
 
Third, CoPs create a specific set of tools and resources, which help CoPs address 
uncertainty. ‘Over time, the joint pursuit of an enterprise creates resources for negotiating 
meaning’ (Wenger 1998: 82). The repertoire of resources that is continuously created and 
re-enacted in a community of practice helps turn the unexpected into normality. While they 
are partly reified, these repertoires remain partly ambiguous and thus open-ended, relying on 
ongoing participation and continuous negotiation of meaning (Wenger 1998, pp.52-57). The 
process is akin to that of ‘structuring the unknown’ described by Robert H. Waterman 
(1990: 41) and that of ‘sensemaking’ explored by Karl E. Weick (1995). Resources can be 
very different and include routines, tools, ways of doing things, words, stories and concepts. 
Examples of stories are ‘war stories’ about error codes not included in repair manual, 
described by Orr (1996), the commands and swearing on the deck of a USS navy ship 
(Hutchins 1995) or the weather analyses and examinations of changing farming practices 
collected by the Senate Agriculture Committee (Boynton 1990, p.200-201). Other instances 
could be the metaphor of the ‘policy cycle’ that many project-oriented activities embrace, 
the ‘non-papers’ that many governmental agencies produce or – more to the case here – 
political reports sent by embassies to capitals with the latest about a foreign country.  
 
A CoP is thus a group of people who routinely share a practice of doing something they see 
as socially meaningful, with tools that they consider appropriate for the task. While 
institutional approaches would often seem to suggest that rules are all there is to see, a CoPs 
perspective underscores instead that what matters is beyond the formal rules and does not 
necessarily coincide with them, as CoPs can exist within and across institutional boundaries. 
An institutional boundary “may therefore correspond to one community of practice, to a 
number of them, or to none at all” (Wenger 1998, p.119). 
 
Two further points need exploration. To start with, CoPs are best analysed at the local level. 
They are an analytical mechanism that helps identify what precisely to zoom in on, in the 
local landscape of practices and in the local “site” (Neumann 2012). A CoP brings in an 
element that marks a half way in between the individual, which is the unit of analysis of 
rational choice, and the overarching structure, on which much constructivism is predicated. 
It highlights the group role and the group dynamics. This is akin to ‘groupthink’ as 
developed in Foreign Policy Analysis, according to which maintaining group consensus and 
personal acceptance by the group become main motivations for action (e.g. Janis 1972). But 
it is interpreted in a light that differs substantially from the aseptic analyses of the 1970s and 
instead shows the relevance of locally situated practices in bringing together the group in the 
first place. CoPs are ‘situated’ and local, emerging from ‘situated’ local practices, an aspect 
that is still unexplored in the literature on CoPs (e.g. Hughes, Jewson et al. 2007, Gherardi 
2009, Nicolini 2013). While much of the literature in IR has focused on ‘macro’ CoPs, akin 
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to the imagined communities of Anderson (Anderson 1983) and involving a large number of 
people (Adler 2008, Adler 2009), the point here is that local CoPs, in which people have 
names, have a different specificity. 
 
Moreover, while CoPs are local, they also take place in a social and political context, which 
affects their making. A CoP is “a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over 
time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice” (Lave 
and Wenger 1991, p.98). The broader social landscape is constituted by a plurality of 
practices, which support a plurality of CoPs, bridged by individuals holding multiple 
memberships but also created in contrast to some of the existing practices. Different 
practices and CoPs can also be bridged by “brokering boundary encounters” (Kubiak, 
Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2015), especially if individuals with multiple memberships act as 
boundary spanners. However, if this is not the case and the situation is conflictual, then a 
CoP can help members rally behind a given practice. In fact, a conflict between practices 
can contribute to create a CoP around a practice, as it sharpens the contrast and clears the 
middle ground of possible alternatives.  
 
Each professional occupation (such as diplomacy) can thus be conceived as a landscape of 
practice, in which different CoPs interact and bring “their own histories, domains, and 
regimes of competence” (Wenger-Trayner and Wenger-Trayner 2015, p.15). A landscape of 
practice thus constitutes a complex social body of knowledge, which is articulated in 
different sub-sets of specific interpretation, some of which overlapping, some of which 
clashing. It is within such a context and on that basis that a CoP exists.  
 
To sum up, the elements of a CoP are a practice (a patterned social activity), a community 
(with a common identity, a common interpretation of what needs doing and density of 
relations) and a set of tools (from keywords to routines). Moreover, I suggest that the most 
interesting examples of CoPs are at the local level, thus involving a limited number of 
people. Finally, CoPs are in interaction with the context they are part of and a conflictual 
context can spur CoPs as much (if not more) than a cooperative one. 
 
Therefore, in the rest of this article I will examine the three components of the European 
diplomatic CoP in the area of East Jerusalem-Ramallah, as well as their local and contextual 
elements. I will start from the analysis of existing practices of resistance and recognition, 
within the conflictual context, before turning to identity, interpretation and tools in the 
following section. 
 
East Jerusalem – Ramallah as a site of conflict, diplomatic resistance and recognition 
 
While this is not the place to summarise the millennia-long history of Jerusalem (e.g. Dumper 
1997, Philipp and Rieniets 2006, Dumper 2011, Montefiore 2011, Dumper 2014, Shlay and 
Rosen 2015) or the details of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Lesch 2008, Peters and Newman 
2013) or even the Europeans’ position towards it (Musu 2010, Muller 2012, Bouris 2014), it 
is crucial to understand the context and the prevailing governing practices in this area, as well 
as the politics of resisting and recognising practices of European diplomats. The aim of this 
section is to paint the “landscape of practices” existing on the ground (Wenger-Trayner, 
Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2015) and show how it has impacted on the geography and the 
political context. Prevailing practices of conflict and occupation have been met by the 
European diplomatic community in the Jerusalem area with a set of actions that challenge the 
status quo. Therefore, after mentioning key legal issues, I will focus on existing practices of 
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conflict, resistance and recognition in their sites of diplomatic representations (the buildings, 
diplomatic privileges and official ceremonies). 
 
The background element to keep in mind is that the status of Jerusalem is very contradictory, 
thus giving plenty of opportunities to develop conflicting practices. In 1947, when the United 
Nations General Assembly approved the partition plan with Res.181, it was agreed that 
Jerusalem would be under a special international regime and governed by the United Nations. 
This special arrangement set it as a corpus separatum, the boundaries of which were broad 
and included “surrounding villages and town”, such as Bethlehem in the south and Shu’fat in 
the north (UNGA Res. 181, Part III, par.B). Ramallah, which lies more to the north and at the 
time was a relatively unknown village, was not included. The armistice agreements that 
brought to an end the 1948-49 war between Israel and its Arab neighbours was based on the 
so-called Green Line, which divided Jerusalem in a Western and Eastern sector,
iii
 the latter in 
the hands of then Transjordan, which annexed it. In 1967, Israel occupied the Eastern part of 
Jerusalem and it was Israel’s turn to de facto annex the city. This situation has thus created a 
very complex legal situation, in which the original idea of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum 
under UN jurisdiction co-exists with the partition of the city in two by the Green Line and the 
de facto (and in 1980 de jure) annexation of the whole city by Israel.
iv
 The legal context has 
been further complicated by Israel’s construction of the Wall, which goes beyond the Green 
Line and created “enforced reorientation of the daily life of the inhabitants” (Dumper 2014, 
p.5).  
 
This has created a diplomatic controversy about where embassies are to be located, which 
dates to the time Israel declared Jerusalem its capital, in 1950. The international community 
did not recognise this move and while Israeli institutions started to shift their seat to 
Jerusalem, embassies stayed in Tel Aviv. When in 1980 Israel passed a new law on Jerusalem 
and moved some of its offices to East Jerusalem, the response was a UN Security Council 
resolution (Res.478) urging those remaining countries that still had diplomatic representation 
in Jerusalem to move them to Tel Aviv, which they did. Since then, the position of the state 
of Israel has been that if states wanted to open a new diplomatic office in Jerusalem, it would 
have to be an embassy to the state of Israel, de facto ‘freezing’ the diplomatic contingent in 
the city, but allowing ‘humanitarian offices’ to be opened in Ramallah. 
 
Therefore it has been an act of political resistance that European diplomatic representations 
still exist in Jerusalem, targeting representation not in Israel but instead in those territories 
(Jerusalem but also Gaza,
v
 Golan Heights and West Bank) over which the Europeans have 
not unanimously recognised a clear source of sovereignty. In Jerusalem, there is a traditional 
‘hard core’ of consular representations, which predated 1967. This is referred to as the 
“Consular Corps of the Corpus Separatum” (see Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People 1997) and it is composed of nine states, which are 
predominantly European: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK (as well as 
Turkey, US and the Vatican). The European representations are all located in the same block, 
literally side by side (in Baybars Street, in the area of Sheikh Jarra: Belgium, France, Italy 
and Sweden) or in its immediate vicinity (Spain and UK). They also share the same 
denomination as ‘Consulates-General.’ In addition, Italy and France have also got offices in 
West Jerusalem, which they tend to use as their main residence. The French residence is 
particularly grand, dating back to the XVII century and to the privileges / responsibilities that 
France had (and continues to claim) on the Holy Sites.  
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In all the other cases, European countries have not been allowed to open an office in East 
Jerusalem and 15 member states opened one in Ramallah instead.
vi
 These represent practices 
that are partially of resistance and partially of recognition. Several but not all are located in 
the same building / venue: in the so-called VIP centre (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta), in 
the al-Watania towers (Hungary, Ireland) or in Othman Ben Affan Street (Denmark, Finland). 
Most notably for our focus, there is a variety of names used to indicate these offices,
vii
 which 
is particularly striking in the case of countries that have recognised Palestine as a state at 
some point (all Central and Eastern European countries,
viii
 plus Cyprus, Malta and Sweden). 
Technically, these should be all diplomatic Embassies, but they do not portray themselves as 
such on their official websites, where a clear, formal and official reference to the state of 
Palestine exists only in the case of Cyprus, Malta and Romania. 
 
Moreover, several European officials have private residencies in East Jerusalem or in 
Ramallah and share with Palestinians the daily grind of occupation. East Jerusalem is the 
‘politically correct’ part of the city in which internationals live (pushing prices to very high 
levels, a challenge for small diplomatic budgets). It also entails living in the worst off parts of 
Jerusalem, where infrastructure is poor and violence much more likely. Ramallah is also a 
disadvantaged location, despite the façade of middle-class that has pervaded parts of the city, 
and reaching Jerusalem from Ramallah entails crossing at least one check-point and facing 
not only the related security issues, but also the traffic jams that check-points (and Qalandiya 
in particular) can create. 
 
A special case is the EU representation, which officially was not to exist where it is and 
probably is the only EU building without the EU flag and without an indication of the EU 
presence.
ix
 It was opened in 1994 in East Jerusalem, with the name of “EU Technical 
Assistance Office to the Palestinians.”
x
 As the EU has refused (or tried to refuse) to 
coordinate development aid with Israeli forces, Israel denied to lease the building. A 
compromise was eventually found (and then found again, when the lease had to be re-
negotiated), but part of it is that no EU signs are to be visible from the outside (see Fig.1). It 
is here, however, that all EU-related meetings, including regular meetings of European 
officials, are held.  
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Fig.1 – The office of the EU Technical Assistance Office in Jerusalem, Sept.2014, notable for 
its lack of EU insignia. I was forbidden to take a clos r picture. 
 
While the existence of these representations shows a practice of resistance to Israeli 
occupation and of partial recognition of the state of Palestine, it is important to specify that de 
facto diplomatic privileges are granted by Israel, as the occupying power. Whereas two 
interviewees recalled that in the past it was customary (if symbolic) to present Consuls 
General’s credentials also to the UN, reflecting the original idea of Jerusalem as a corpus 
separatum under UN authority, this practice was fallen in disregard by 2014. The practice of 
diplomatic privileges has thus put the Europeans in the position to at least partially recognise 
the de facto authority of Israel over the occupied territories. 
 
Interviewees confirm (contra Mochon 1996) that most (if not all) diplomats belonging to 
European representations (be they in Jerusalem or in Ramallah) are listed as consular 
personnel on the EU member states’ embassies in Tel Aviv. It is inclusion into this list that 
grants them some (but not all) diplomatic privileges, such as for instance a ‘CC’ (consular 
corps) car plaque. The issue came forcefully to public attention after the Swedish recognition 
of the state of Palestine in October 2014, as Israel was able to force a downgrading of the 
Swedish Consulate General by refusing diplomatic immunity to the person who would have 
replaced a departing Swedish official. Moreover, the Swedish minister of Foreign Affairs and 
her deputy have been denied security cover by Israel, de facto barring them from visiting 
Israel, Jerusalem and Palestinian territories in January 2015. Other Swedish officials have 
also faced difficulties.
xi
 Less in the public domain, but equally interesting is the case of the 
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French School in Jerusalem, which is located in West Jerusalem and has constantly aimed to 
establish itself as an extra-territorial entity, a move regularly contested by Israel. 
 
Palestinian authorities are more than willing to grant diplomatic privileges, but it is of no 
consequences. On the contrary, they address all European officials as ‘ambassadors’ and use 
all the formalities that go with the title. However, the everyday of occupation means that only 
Israel has the ultimate monopoly of force, which makes the daily resistance of European 
officials interesting, if only partially successful.  
 
As well as ‘being on site’ as a practice of (partial) resistance and recognition, European 
officials avoid ‘being on site with Israeli symbols.’ Therefore, they avoid visiting public sites 
in Jerusalem accompanied by Israeli forces or participating in Israeli ceremonies held beyond 
the Green Line. European diplomats have long since established that they should “avoid 
having Israeli security and/or protocol accompanying high ranking officials from Member 
States when visiting the Old City/East Jerusalem” (quoted in Dumper 2014, p. 176), in order 
to avoid the inevitable picture of them smiling amid Israeli soldiers or policemen next to a 
well-recognisable monument, e.g. in the Old City. Moreover, that part of diplomatic life 
which is participation to public ceremonies is also a potential minefield. The UK established 
that “the Consul-General and staff do not attend Israeli national functions although they do 
attend municipal functions within pre-1967 borders unless connected with anniversaries such 
as the unification of Jerusalem” (quoted in Dumper 1997, p.246). 
 
Therefore, the landscape in which European diplomats are embedded in the East Jerusalem-
Ramallah area is one in which conflict and occupation are the prevailing practices, resistance 
and recognition are intertwined, compromises are found but principles also upheld. It is a 
landscape of practices in which there is a strong hostility to the European presence and this 
has contributed to fuel European diplomatic practices of resistance to Israeli occupation and 
recognition of Palestinian forms of political authority. 
 
European diplomats in the East Jerusalem – Ramallah area as a community of practice 
 
Out of the daily poignancy of the practices described, European diplomats have developed a 
clear identity and a set of tools with which they address uncertainties related to their job and 
to the European foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The community spirit 
and the type of resources they have developed is best exemplified in the yearly issuing of a 
report on East Jerusalem (see also Bicchi 2014). This report is the most widely known 
example of reports issued by European Heads of Mission (HoMs), given its relevance in 
terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It provides an annual assessment of developments on the 
ground in East Jerusalem and as such it is particularly important, though generally considered 
stronger than what Brussels and most European capitals tend to find palatable. It is used here 
as a key indicator of the existence of a CoP, as community of interpretation. 
 
The European representation started to produce a yearly report on East Jerusalem in 2004, 
although in the previous years a ‘Jerusalem Watch’ report was occasionally circulated.
xii
 At 
first the report was public, but it became confidential in 2005. It is, however, regularly leaked 
to the press,
xiii
 and it used to reach the public domain, until the 2015 assessment of 2014, 
which is the last publicly available one.
xiv
 
 
The reports tend to be divided in three parts (regardless of the specific number of sections), 
the last one being the most relevant for our purpose. First, the report includes reliable data, be 
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it from a UN publication or a map or similar. Second, there is a political assessment of the 
situation in East Jerusalem, which generally tackles settlements in and around East Jerusalem, 
restrictions on Palestinian housing, access to the city, etc. Third and most importantly, there 
is a set of recommendations. These are numerous, specific and far-reaching. They usually 
include a few contentious points, on which there is no agreement among EU member states, 
if we listen to what emerges from Brussels or from national capitals. The 2009 report, for 
instance, mentioned the option to prevent financial transactions from EU member states’ 
actors that support settlers in East Jerusalem “by adopting appropriate EU legislation”, and 
information sharing on violent settlers to assess “whether to grant entry into the EU”. While 
the word ‘sanctions’ is banned from EU-speak, there has been a similar flavour in the 
recommendations across the years. In the most recent edition of the report, the tone of 
recommendations has been slightly less outspoken. For instance, in relation to violent settlers, 
the 2015 report suggests to “consider possible consequences” “as regards immigration 
regulations in the EU member states.” The meaning is however univocal. 
 
The identity of views on this set of contentious issues underscores the existence of a 
“community of interpretation,” in which members see eye to eye in terms of not only which 
data is relevant and reliable, but also how to interpret it and what kind of policy conclusions 
to draw from it. The fact that recommendations go beyond the consensus reached in Brussels 
and in national capitals also speaks to the “appropriatedness” of the endeavour on the part of 
the community of practitioners. The report is a tool this CoP has developed in order to make 
sense of the conflict in which they are embedded, as well as to communicate their 
interpretation to both Brussels and their national capitals. 
 
Equally interesting in the case of this report is the process leading up to it, and how it has 
evolved. In 2009, when I was able to follow the process quite closely, the report was 
requested by the (then Swedish) Presidency of the Council Working Group on the Middle 
East Peace Process (COMEP) to contribute to the drafting of the Council Conclusions for 
December 2009. Sweden kicked off the process in Jerusalem, convening the first meeting in 
summer 2009. Most importantly, however, Sweden did not prepare a draft of the report. On 
the contrary, at the first meeting the Swedish political officer in Jerusalem raised a number of 
points for discussion with her colleagues such as the exact definition of the term ‘Jerusalem,’ 
the structure of the report, and the need to update and prioritise facts as well as to discuss the 
EU interest.
xv
 After 3-4 meetings addressing these general aspects, national representatives 
agreed to share the load in drafting the report.
xvi
 One country focused on social services, 
another on ID cards, a third on religious affairs, etc.,
xvii
 in an ad hoc manner and without 
‘domaines réservés.’
xviii
 On the contrary, political officers discussed openly the sources they 
were thinking of consulting and received suggestions about further sources that might be able 
to deliver useful information.
xix
 They then pieced it together, refined it as much as possible, 
and passed it on to the HoMs. The HoMs went over every single word, consulted bilaterally 
with their capitals and finalized the text. The process was, therefore, a “collective 
endeavour,” as a diplomat put it, with “red lines” being decided “en route,” rather than a 
priori.
xx
 
 
The report went then on to play a significant role in the controversial Declaration issued by 
the Council on 8
th
 of December, 2009. The controversy focused on member states’ intention 
(later partially downsized) to declare East Jerusalem the capital of the future Palestinian state. 
As the draft of the Declaration prepared by the PSC was leaked to the press, Israel started a 
diplomatic battle to tone it down, with some success.
xxi
 Still, the Declaration was unusual for 
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the emphasis on the issue of Jerusalem, which directly relied on the content of the HoMs 
report.  
 
Since then, the process has changed, but only to an extent. The 2013 report, which analysed 
events in 2012, was prepared with a similar division of labour. As an interviewee explained, 
it came to include a proviso in order to be approved, specifying that recommendations were 
to be implemented “as appropriate.” In 2014, when the 2015 report was in preparation and I 
was able to interview European diplomats
xxii
 as well as within the EU Delegation,
xxiii
 EU 
officials were by then in charge of coordinating the preparatory work, the Lisbon Treaty 
having abolished the rotating national Presidency in favour of the EEAS. The process 
remained however very similar, stemming from an informal discussion among political 
officers before being polished by HoMs with the contribution of capitals. It remains to be 
seen whether the further consolidation of the EEAS brought subsequently a more centralised 
approach to the drafting. 
 
While the above shows a common interpretation of events by local European diplomats and 
EU officials and thus the existence of a community of interpretation/practice, where should 
its boundaries be located? The evidence shows that there is a difference between the 
interpretation prevailing in the Jerusalem area, on the one hand, and those embraced in 
Brussels and in member states’ national capitals, on the other. The view from 
Jerusalem/Ramallah is considered more assertive than elsewhere and several of the 
recommendations put forward in the reports on East Jerusalem are not embraced in Brussels, 
when they come under scrutiny in the Maghreb-Machrek (MAMA) Working Group of the 
Council, as testified by the Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process that the Council 
regularly approves. Moreover, in Brussels it is customary to divide participants of the 
MAMA Working Group in two “like-minded” formations, a more pro-Israeli one and a more 
pro-Palestinian one, as referred to by interviewees. Capitals’ views can be even further apart 
than the Conclusions or declarations issued in Brussels, as shown by the occasional 
statements issued by individual member states after Council Conclusions or (more often) 
declarations. There are, therefore, clear boundaries between ‘the view from Jerusalem,’ ‘the 
view(s) from Brussels’ and ‘the views from the capitals.’  
 
How do we explain the existence of such a boundary? Is this a case in which diplomats ‘go 
native’ (Berridge 2010, pp.107-08) or ‘rogue’ and lose touch with the ‘real’ policy line set at 
home? Three points are of relevance here. First, the gap is not too broad to be bridged at 
times. During the period 2009-2014, a remarkable convergence occurred about the broad 
guidelines set in Jerusalem/Ramallah and several of the recommendations proposed were 
adopted. Second, capitals that were reluctant to follow this trend have since become more 
assertive. Earlier on, in 2010, an interviewee suggested it was “easier to reach unanimity” in 
Jerusalem than in Brussels or in capitals. Moreover, another interviewee mentioned that the 
report was useful “to keep the capitals informed,” thus indicating a clear sense of direction to 
the flow of knowledge, from the local CoP to capitals. This has however changed. In 2013, 
capitals reportedly became more involved in the drafting of the report and more than one 
interviewee mentioned double-checking the final draft with his/her capital. While double-
checking was the exception in 2013, the following year an influential interviewee lamented 
that “now capitals interfere in the process” and the report, which should be “provocative” and 
stir a debate in Brussels and in capitals, had instead become plain. This was confirmed for 
instance by the relief shown by a more pro-Israel diplomat in the Jerusalem area in 2014. 
2014 seems thus to mark the reverse in the trend. While in 2010 the interpretation of the 
Jerusalem CoP was influential in Brussels and in capitals, the capitals reacted by reigning in 
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on the freedom that their diplomats in Jerusalem had. This points to a trajectory in the 
existence of a CoP in the Jerusalem area, which was able to coalesce around a locally 
established interpretation in 2010-13, but was threatened in its existence by the encroachment 
of capitals (and related national CoPs) by 2014. This finding also highlights interesting 
research avenues, centred on how local CoPs of European diplomats interact or overlap with 
existing CoPs in Brussels and in national capitals, which also contribute to the making of 
European foreign policy.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has showed how better to understand an empirical case study (European foreign 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict) by using the suggestion of practice approaches to 
focus on practices, landscapes and, in this case, communities of practices, with a special 
emphasis on the local and the micro-dimension. It will have served its purpose if readers will 
take home not only a clearer understanding of what Europe is and does (and how Europe is 
done and by whom) in this case, but also a better sense of how practices can be employed to 
analyse empirical evidence and gather theoretical insights.  
 
The first goal of this article has been to engage with the analytical concept ‘community of 
practice’ to highlight interesting parts of empirical evidence, while providing theoretical 
leverage. During the period 2010-14, European diplomats in the Jerusalem area represented a 
CoP based on their common practices of political resistance and recognition, on their 
common interpretation of what needs doing (as expressed in their reports to Brussels) and on 
the set of tools they developed. Moreover, in the case under scrutiny, the context (or, more 
specifically, the landscape) of occupation practices, together with the contradictory status of 
Jerusalem, has helped practitioners practice the same forms of (partial) resistance and 
recognition, as visible in their diplomatic seats, in their diplomatic status and in their 
participation in the official life in Jerusalem.  
 
The evidence gathered here also points to areas for further exploration, beyond the obvious 
one of the post-2014 period. The first area is the relationship between the macro, meso and 
micro level in the analysis of CoPs. CoPs can be found at any of these levels and they can 
also mediate between these levels (cf. Conclusions, in Hughes, Jewson et al. 2007). While 
much of the IR literature has used CoPs for macro phenomena (Adler 2008, Adler 2009, Goff 
2015), this does not exhaust the range of possibilities, which instead should include analyses 
of micro phenomena, such as here. Macro CoPs are a very suggestive metaphor, but local 
CoPs are a more punctual analytical instrument, which allows for a closer examination of e.g. 
relations between insiders and outsiders. The beauty of local CoPs is that participants know 
each other’s name, instead of just ‘imagining’ a collective group and projecting their own 
identity onto a group. A second avenue for further research consists of relations between 
CoPs. This includes the relationship between local CoPs, such as in the East Jerusalem-
Ramallah area, and other existing CoPs, such as in Brussels and in national capitals, which 
also contribute to the same macro-practices (e.g. the Middle East Peace Process, EU foreign 
policy, diplomacy). 
 
The second goal of this article has been to stress the relevance of the local and the everyday 
as a site in which the universal is to be captured. The issue here is not to identify ‘nice 
stories’ or ‘single-outcome case studies’ (Gerring 2006), but rather to capture the general 
pattern through its embodiment in the local and in the everyday, without which it would not 
exist. Therefore, the description of the way in which European diplomats act and represent 
Europe in the area in and around Jerusalem is a description of how Europe tries (among other 
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practices) to resist Israeli occupation and contribute to the recognition of Palestinian 
institutions as a different source of political authority. While writing, I have in mind 
European diplomats spending considerable time to navigate the difficult Jerusalemite 
landscape, with their ‘CC’ car plaque, on their way to a meeting in the EU Delegation’s 
anonymous building. This is not spectacular resistance, it is not complete resistance (which 
would entail leaving the area), but it is a form of resistance that instantiates the European 
position on Jerusalem. Similarly, it is not a full recognition of the state of Palestine, as 
Sweden most notably experienced. But it is a way to keep the possibility of recognition open.  
 
Therefore, in my view practice approaches are an interesting ontological and epistemological 
development, which does not necessarily entail jettisoning well-established theoretical 
traditions in International Relations, but suggests instead an attention to specific issues and 
mechanisms – a shift of emphasis. While other authors in this special issue have brought 
forward the agenda of practice theory stricto sensu, I would like to conclude by encouraging 
a plurality of practice turns within existing theoretical perspectives, as practice approaches 
can contribute to all debates aiming to navigate between methodological individualism and 
structuralism. 
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i
 The EU Delegation is not formally called so, as explained below. 
ii For an early overview of different definitions, see Cox (2005). 
iii
 As well as a portion of land defined as ‘no-man’s land.’ 
iv
 For an overview of the different but overlapping regimes that regulates the city, see Del Sarto (2014) and 
Dumper (2014). 
v Gaza is another interesting case. As it is nearly completely cut off from Jerusalem and from the West Bank, 
EU member states have started in recent years to open nominal offices in the Gaza Strip, which European 
officials visit occasionally – raising the issue of the extent to which they lend recognition of the de facto 
government in Gaza, which is run by Hamas. 
vi Countries not represented either in Jerusalem or in Ramallah are: Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia.  
vii
 Correct at the time of going to press, 24 August 2016. It is interesting to note that discrepancies remain 
despite the attempt by the EU Delegation to present a uniform set of denominations: see 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/travel_eu/consulates/index_en.htm for the list, last visited 24 August 
2016. 
viii
 Baltic countries excluded. 
ix
 Correct as of September 2014. 
x But it is currently listed together with other EU Delegations. See: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/index_en.htm accessed 12.2.2016 
xi
 See a summary here: http://www.timesofisrael.com/swedish-officials-unwelcome-in-israel-deputy-fm-says/ 
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